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Abstract A substantial literature has studied gender differences in political participation
in Western industrialized democracies, but little is known about such gaps in sub-Saharan
African nations. Using 2005 Afrobarometer data, this paper presents a systematic inves-
tigation of the gender gap in political participation across 18 sub-Saharan African coun-
tries. In line with cultural isomorphism, patterns in gender gaps across different types of
participation generally mirror those of Western democracies, with small to no gender gaps
in registration to vote, but substantial gaps in less institutionalized types of participation.
Yet, the remaining large gaps cannot be explained by gender differences in socioeconomic
characteristics and political attitudes as suggested in studies on Western industrialized
nations. Finally, substantial cross-national differences within the sub-Saharan African are
found, substantiating the importance of more ﬁne-grained examinations of variation across
sub-Saharan African nations.
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1 Introduction
Political participation is good for democracy, but all democracies are plagued by sys-
tematic inequalities in participation (Lijphart 1997; Galston 2001). One of the most per-
sistent has been according to gender, such that women are found to participate less than
men, and suggesting that half the population’s interests are less well represented (Andersen
1975; Schlozman et al. 1994). Yet, the vast majority of research on gender gaps in political
participation is based on patterns occurring in Western industrialized democracies (largely
the U.S. and Western Europe), raising questions about the applicability of ﬁndings and
explanations for gender differences in developing democracies.
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in different types of participation across 18 sub-Saharan African nations, using 2005
Afrobarometer data. In evaluating whether prior research on gender gaps in political
participation in industrialized nations can be usefully extended, two related aspects are
investigated. First, whether the pattern in, and size of, gender gaps across different types of
political participation in sub-Saharan African nations are similar to those found in previous
research on Western nations, and second, the extent to which standard explanations for the
gender gap (i.e., gender differences in socioeconomic resources and political attitudes)
substantially mediate gaps found in the sub-Saharan African nations. Such an analysis of
sub-Saharan African nations opens additional research opportunities to explore questions
of the inﬂuence of modernization or cultural isomorphism and speaks to the large debate
about gender equality across the globe (Desposato and Norrander 2009; Inglehart and
Norris 2003; Meyer et al. 1997). Moreover, by focusing on a sample of individual nations,
it counters a tendency of treating sub-Saharan Africa as a monolithic bloc of poor, under-
developed or agrarian nations.
The paper proceeds as follows. We review past research on gender and political par-
ticipation, the relevance of these debates to African nations, and ﬁndings from the small
literature therein. We also consider the unique advantages of studying political partici-
pation in Africa, and introduce our data, measures and methods. After describing the extent
of the gender gap between the different sub-Saharan African nations, we turn to multi-
variate analyses investigating the extent to which gender gaps can be explained by gender
differences in socioeconomic and attitudinal characteristics. We next explore potential
connections between a given nation’s political, social and economic context and the extent
of gender gaps in participation. We conclude with an overview of the core ﬁndings, and the
contributions made to understanding political participation in sub-Saharan Africa.
2 Gender Gaps in Political Participation
Gender inequalities in political participation remain an important part of ‘‘democracy’s
unresolved dilemma’’ of unequal participation (Lijphart 1997). For these reasons a great
deal of research has been devoted to evaluating gender gaps in political participation.
Questions mainly center on whether a gap exists, how large it is, and where it occurs.
Below we brieﬂy review ﬁndings on these questions based on Western industrialized
democracies, and implications for sub-Saharan African nations.
2.1 The Size and Pattern of Gender Gaps in Western Industrialized Democracies
Based on research that focuses on gender gaps in political participation among Western
industrialized democracies, the ‘‘good news’’ is that gender differentials in one of the most
importantformsofparticipation—voting—areshrinkingtothepointofinsigniﬁcanceand,in
somecountries,evenreversing(Coffe ´ andBolzendahl2010;Currell2005;Parry,Moyserand
Day 1992; Uhlaner 1989; Verba et al. 1997). Nevertheless, gender gaps persist in most other
types of political participation, and men are signiﬁcantly more involved than women in a
number of outlets such as strikes, demonstrations, contacting political ofﬁcials, and political
party membership (Coffe ´ and Bolzendahl 2010; Inglehart and Norris 2003; Marien et al.
2010). Thus, gender remains a meaningful source of inequality in political participation.
Clearly, the gender gap varies according to how participation is measured. Among the
more ‘‘institutional’’ forms of participation, while voting gaps appear to be shrinking,
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123participation in political parties and running for ofﬁce remain dominated by men (Paxton
et al. 2007). Among the less institutional, or more informal, forms of participation, gender
difference patterns vary even further (Coffe ´ and Bolzendahl 2010), and scholars increas-
ingly emphasize the importance of less institutional forms of participation (Dalton 2008;
Marien et al. 2010). Women tend to be as likely, or more so, as men to engage in
individualistic forms of participation such as signing a petition, political consumerism, or
donating money. Men however, are more likely than women to engage in collective forms
of participation (e.g., a demonstration) or to directly contact a politician (Burns 2007;
Coffe ´ and Bolzendahl 2010; Marien et al. 2010; Parry et al. 1992; Pattie et al. 2003).
Together, these ﬁndings suggest any consideration of gender differences should include
measures of participation beyond the ballot box.
2.2 Gender Gaps in Sub-Saharan Africa: Modernization Versus Cultural Isomorphism?
There is very little research testing the size or scope of the gender gap in political par-
ticipation among sub-Saharan African nations. However, studying these nations not only
allows us to see if ﬁndings and assumptions based on Western democracies hold true in
less-developed regions, but may also provide insight into broader questions concerning
theories of modernization and cultural isomorphism. More speciﬁcally: Do gender gaps in
political participation among sub-Saharan African states reﬂect outcomes based on their
modernization status or might ‘‘world society’’ affect nations beyond their level of
modernization?
The modernization approach generally argues that as incomes rise, women gain eco-
nomic resources, more egalitarian sex roles emerge, and cultural values change, leading to
increasing levels of female participation in political life (Inglehart 1990, 1997) and
implicitly ﬁts with the classic linear understanding of citizenship rights (Marshall 1950).
The linear assumptions embedded in this description of the modernization approach have
been rejected to a certain degree and reformulated as involving contingent processes of
path dependence and cultural inﬂuence (Inglehart and Norris 2003, 2005; Inglehart and
Welzel 2005).
1 Regardless, the implication of such assumptions is that women’s gains will
be dependent on the nations’ greater economic and political development as it impacts
cultural/social values. Based on this perspective, we would expect gender gaps to be much
larger in sub-Saharan African nations than those found in research on Western nations
because sub-Saharan African nations lag behind in their economic and political devel-
opment and associated cultural attitudes (e.g., rational and self-expression values) (In-
glehart and Norris 2003, 2005).
In support of modernization-based understandings of women’s political inequality, the
limited research on gender gaps in political participation in sub-Saharan African nations
suggests the size of the gender gap is substantial across these countries. Despite impressive
gains in many nations in access to de jure equality (McEwan 2005) and formal political
representation (Geisler 2004; Ballington 1998, 2004), scholars agree that women in sub-
Saharan African nations face pervasive oppression in terms of exclusion from leadership
roles, resources to mobilize, private patriarchy, and male control over female political
spaces (Beck 2003; Bratton 1999; Geisler 1995, 2004; McEwan 2000, 2003). All of these
factors are likely to block women’s participation in political life.
1 This issue is pursued in much greater detail in a response by Inglehart and Norris (2005) describing and
defending modernization theory in a response to critiques by Adams and Orloff (2005a), but see response by
Adams and Orloff (2005b).
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in Zambia ﬁnds that gender is one of the most consistent determinants of unequal par-
ticipation (Bratton 1999). Yet, the results are not unequivocal. Men and women are equally
likely to register to vote and to engage in communal political activities (e.g., meetings and
rallying). However, men who were registered to vote were much more likely than women
to actually do so, and men were more likely to contact political ofﬁcials. Thus, the
Zambian ﬁndings support conclusions reached in Western research that gender gaps vary
by type of participation, and this variation suggests modernization cannot fully explain
gender gaps in political participation.
The lack of a consistent, large gender gap across forms of participation suggests a
number of further questions, which have also been raised in recent critiques of moderni-
zation approaches in regard to gender (Adams and Orloff 2005a, b; Adams et al. 2005;
Young 2003, 2005). It has been argued that modernization approaches inadequately
identify and problematize uneven processes internal to modernization and that alternative
approaches are required that acknowledge systematic and unequal power relationships
between and within states that help structure outcomes (Adams and Orloff 2005a, b). Thus
in order to gain a complete understanding of gender inequality in developing nations, the
generalizations contained within modernization theory may be inadequate (Desposato and
Norrander 2009).
2 Even in Western nations, feminist state scholars note that gains in
women’s equality have been uneven, with women achieving rights in piecemeal fashion
(contrary to assumptions in Marshall (1950)) (Pateman 1988 [1970]). Similarly, prior
research ﬁnds that many sub-Saharan African women have gained public political rights
that are not matched privately or informally, and de facto access to civil rights may lag in
nations that otherwise make progressive social rights guarantees (e.g., South Africa)
(Bauer 2009, p. 194; Beck 2003; Lindberg 2004; Nisbet 2008).
Given these issues, it is helpful to incorporate insights from research on world society,
particularly the concept of cultural isomorphism (Meyer et al. 1997). Such an approach
highlights the ways in which global ideas about women’s political involvement and
equality may have strongly inﬂuenced gender gaps in participation across the globe.
Speciﬁcally, women’s rights in African nations are not developing in a vacuum. Interna-
tional connections diffuse norms and ideas (Gray et al. 2006), and events outside sub-
Saharan Africa in countries as varied as the Soviet Union, East Germany, and China, have
been presented as inﬂuential factors for the contents of demands and the timing of protests
in sub-Saharan Africa in the beginning of the nineties (Bratton and van de Walle 1992),
illustrating the ‘‘diffusion effect’’ of successful democratic revolutions across the globe.
Moreover, Western colonial legacies continue to shape the political institutions of these
nations, reinforced by donor pressure (e.g., the IMF) and Western (governmental and non-
governmental) organizations focused on women’s political equality. Speciﬁcally, in 1975
the UN began the ‘‘Decade for Women,’’ and since then numerous UN women’s confer-
ences have been actively used by women from African nations to pursue greater roles in
their own countries (Geisler 2004). Additionally these nations have faced regional pres-
sures from groups such as the African Union and the Protocol on the Rights of Women in
Africa to implement policies to improve the lives of women (Scribner and Lambert 2010).
2 We note that Adams and Orloff (2005a, b) accept the basic premise of modernization as a positive
inﬂuence on gender equality and women’s lives in general, instead calling for a more contextual approach
that can speak directly to ‘‘aberrations’’ in modernity and the progress of women’s rights, among other
issues. In comparison, other scholarship more fundamentally rejects modernization as a progressive force
(Young 2003, 2005).
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123Taken together, these factors are not a rejection of the inﬂuence of modernization, per
se, especially given that many of the factors described above (e.g., the UN) might be seen
as outcomes of the global modernizing process (Adams and Orloff 2005a, b). However, to
the extent that the modernization approach underestimates the inﬂuence of global society,
we suggest the utility of the cultural isomorphism perspective which expects many features
of nation-states to ‘‘derive from worldwide models constructed and propagated through
global cultural and associational processes’’ (Meyer et al. 1997, p. 144). Thus, global
processes diffusing models of gender equality and participation across sub-Saharan Africa
would suggest that gender patterns of political involvement are not substantially different
from those found in studies on the West.
Theories of modernization and cultural isomorphism lead to different assumptions
regarding the overall size and pattern of gender gaps in sub-Saharan Africa, but largely
ignore differences internal to this region. Relative to Western democracies, nations in Sub-
Saharan Africa may share more similarities than differences, but such an approach
obscures important economic and political differences between the nations, different
colonial heritages, and divergent trajectories towards and citizens’ attitudes to democracy
(Bratton 2007). Recognizing these cross-national differences within the region of sub-
Saharan Africa and their potential effect on the gender gap in political participation, we
analyze each nation individually in the results that follow as well as descriptively analyzing
important contextual inﬂuences unique to each nation.
3 Sources of Gender Gaps in Political Participation
In addition to considering whether the size and pattern of gender gaps in political par-
ticipation in sub-Saharan African nations resemble gaps found in previous research on
Western nations, we also explore the extent to which common explanations of gender gaps
presented in research on Western industrialized nations can be extended to nations in the
region of sub-Saharan Africa. Hereafter, we brieﬂy present explanations for gender gaps in
Western Industrialized nations and to what extent they may be relevant in the study on sub-
Saharan African nations.
3.1 Explaining Gender Gaps in Western Industrialized Democracies
Previous research on gender gaps in political participation among Western industrialized
nations has proposed at least two sets of explanations. First, it has been found that a
signiﬁcant portion of the gap is due to systematic individual-level differences between men
and women in terms of socioeconomic resources. This research argues that women are less
likely to engage in politics because of their lower access to such resources. For example,
men are far more likely to be employed full-time than women, and employment is posi-
tively related to political participation, information and efﬁcacy among U.S. respondents
(Schlozman et al. 1994, 1999). Further, women (employed or not) are more likely to be
burdened with house and care work, placing further demands on their time and resources,
leaving them less available for political participation (Burns et al. 1997). Thus, controlling
for characteristics such as employment, education, marital status, and parental status is
found to mediate a substantial portion of a gender gap in participation (Burns 2007;
Harrison and Munn 2007).
Other research suggests there is an independent inﬂuence of attitudes on participation
and that regardless of socio-economic resources, political engagement requires motivation
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123and interest (Inglehart and Norris 2003). U.S. research suggests women’s lower levels of
political information, interest, and efﬁcacy are important explanations for a gender gap
independent of other characteristics (Verba et al. 1997). Women’s lack of political interest
and information may be rooted in social processes of gender socialization both as children
and adults (Burns 2007; Lovenduski 2005; Rapoport 1981; Verba et al. 1997). Women are
socialized toward a gender role that is more passive, private, rule-abiding, and compas-
sionate, while men are oriented toward leadership, public roles, autonomy and self-reliance
(Brownmiller 1984; Fox and Lawless 2004; West and Zimmerman 1987). This sociali-
zation may contribute to women’s lower levels of political engagement (Atkeson and
Rapoport 2003; Rapoport 1981) with differences in political attitudes and participation
beginning early in life (Fridkin and Kenney 2007; Hooghe and Stolle 2004) and continuing
over the life course (Alwin et al. 1991). Thus, controlling for political attitudes has also
been found to substantially mediate gender differences in political participation (Verba
et al. 1997).
3.2 Explaining Gender Gaps in Sub-Saharan African Nations
Whether the explanations for gender gaps in participation from Western democracies can
be extended to sub-Saharan African nations remains unclear. Participation may follow
different patterns in fragile, new democracies compared to established democracies
(Bratton 1999). Research explaining gender gaps in political participation across African
nations is extremely limited, and the Western-based measures of individual socio-eco-
nomic and attitudinal explanations of the gender gap may have to be reconsidered. More
generally, Dalton et al. (2009:72) conclude that ‘‘democratic institutions facilitate the
translation of individual resources into political action,’’ suggesting that socioeconomic
characteristics will have a stronger affect on engagement in political activities in rich
democratic societies than in poorer, less-democratic societies. Bratton’s (1999) study of
Zambia shows that the standard socioeconomic status and political attitude variables have
little explanatory power in explaining political participation.
Looking to the experiences of women in sub-Saharan African exempliﬁes why standard
accounts may not hold. For example, women’s participation in the economy is not as
strongly linked to control or autonomy as it might be in Western nations (Geisler 2004).
More speciﬁcally, Western colonial culture emphasized the ideal of the ‘‘real housewife,’’
with women as the primary providers of unpaid family labor and men as public, political
ﬁgures (Geisler 2004), but in reality sub-Saharan African women were pressured to remain
active in the formal (and informal) economy—typically without supportive rights. All of
this has contributed to a type of de facto economic marginalization that may be inde-
pendent of actually employment status, and is further exacerbated by the fact that unem-
ployment hits African women harder than men (McEwan 2000).
In terms of marital roles, colonialism sometimes inadvertently made marriage more
ﬁnancially advantageous to women by changing divorce laws to reﬂect Western mores
(Geisler 2004), but women may still struggle under ‘‘customary’’ marriages arrangements
that offer women few rights and lower status (McEwan 2000). In some ways these mirror
Western stories about women’s lower access to resources, including ﬁndings that African
women have unequal access to education and evidence of a positive relationship between
education and support for democracy (Evans and Rose 2007; Lindberg 2004), but in other
ways it highlights the ways in which women’s and men’s negotiation of work and family
roles may be quite different. Thus, it is unclear whether standard controls substantially
mediate gender gaps among the nations we investigate.
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1234 Data and Measurements
To answer our research question on a gender gap in political participation in Africa, we use
data from the 2005 Afrobarometer Survey, a public attitude survey on democracy, market
reform and civil society. The survey is a collaborative effort of 18 research institutes in
various sub-Saharan African nations: Benin, Botswana, Cape Verde, Ghana, Kenya,
Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, South
Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.
3 For each country a national proba-
bility sample that represents an accurate cross section of the voting age population is
interviewed. Random selection is used at every stage of sampling and the sample is
stratiﬁed to ensure that all major demographic segments of the population are covered.
Interviews were conducted face-to-face by trained interviewers in the language of the
respondent’s choice. Further details on the survey can be found in the survey manual of
Afrobarometer Network (Carter 2008)o ro nwww.afrobarometer.org, where data are
publically available.
4.1 Dependent Variables
Three different types of political participation: registration to vote,
4 collective action and
contact. To assess voting registration, the survey asks: ‘‘Understanding that some [Gha-
naians/Kenyans/etc.] were not able to register as voters for the [20XX] elections; which
statement is true for you?’’ Responses include: (1) you were registered to vote; (2) you did
not want to register; (3) you could not ﬁnd a place to register; (4) you were prevented from
registering; (5) you were too young to register; (6) you did not register for some other
reason. The variable was recoded into a dichotomous yes/no response, and 80 percent of
respondents said they registered.
Our second type of political participation refers to collective action and is assessed by a
sum scale of two items: ‘‘attending a community meeting’’ and ‘‘joining others to raise an
issue.’’ Respondents are asked whether they have done the activity during the past year,
and if not, whether they would do it if they had the chance. Answer categories are (0) no,
would never do this; (1) no, but would do if had the chance; (2) yes, once or twice; (3) yes,
several times; (4) yes, often. The sum scale was rescaled to be continuous within this
range.
Contacting political institutions and/or persons is a sum scale, made from four items, all
asking ‘‘during the past year, how often have you contacted any of the following persons
for help to solve a problem or to give them your views,’’ with the following persons/
institutions mentioned: local government councilor, a Member of Parliament/National
Assembly Representative, an ofﬁcial of a government ministry, or a political party ofﬁcial.
For each question, respondents could choose between four answers, running from (0) never
to (3) often. The additive scale was rescaled to be continuous within this range.
3 Data for contacting politicians and political institutions are missing for Zimbabwe.
4 We do not include the act of voting since among those who had registered to vote, more than 93.5 percent
claimed to have voted. Such limited variation makes it impossible to perform reliable regression analyses.
Explorative bivariate analyses indicate that the patterns of gender gaps in actual voting are similar to those
found for registration to vote (presented below). With the exception of Zambia where a small signiﬁcant
gender gap is found for voting whereas no signiﬁcant gender effect is found for registration to vote. In those
countries where signiﬁcant bivariate gender gaps are found with respect to registration to vote, signiﬁcant
gender gaps in voting are also apparent.
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1234.2 Explanatory Variables
The main focus of the analysis, gender, is measured as a dichotomous variable with 0 for
male and 1 for female respondents.
To test socioeconomic explanations for the gender gap, we include age, religion, edu-
cation, employment status, place of residence, and poverty. Age is a continuous variable.
Respondents older than 99 (n = 7) were excluded from the analyses. We also introduced a
squared value for age to control for non-linearities in the effect as a life-course control.
Religion is a dummy variable distinguishing Christians from those afﬁliated with all other
religions and the non-religious.
5 Church attendance is treated as a continuous variables
ranging from (0) never attend to (5) attend more than once a week. Education is measure
by three categories: not completed primary school, completed primary school, and com-
pleted secondary school or higher. Employment is a dummy variable indicating whether a
person is currently employed part or full-time versus not employed. Place of residence is
self-assessed as either rural (0) or urban (1). Finally, poverty adds ﬁve similarly scaled
items measuring how often (ranging from (0) never to (4) always) the respondent or
anyone from his/her family has gone without ‘‘enough food to eat,’’ ‘‘enough clean water
for house use,’’ ‘‘medicines or medical use,’’ ‘‘enough fuel to cook food,’’ and ‘‘a cash
income’’ (a = .78).
We also assess the inﬂuence of three indicators of political attitudes: trust in political
institutions or political agents, political efﬁcacy and interest in public affairs. We measure
trust in political institutions through trust in six types of political institutions or agents: the
president, parliament/national assembly, electoral commission, elected local government
council, ruling party, opposition political parties (a = .83). Each has a possible response of
(0) not at all; (1) just a little; (2) somewhat; (3) a lot. Our indicator of political efﬁcacy is
based on a Likert-scaled item asking ‘‘Do you agree or disagree with the following
statement: Politics and government sometimes seem so complicated that you can’t really
understand what’s going on.’’ The possible answers range from (0) strongly agree to (4)
strongly disagree. Finally, one question is used to measure interest in public affairs: ‘‘How
interested would you say you are in public affairs?’’ The possible answers range from (0)
not at all interested to (3) very interested. Means for all dependent and explanatory vari-
ables, divided by gender subgroup, are provided in the ‘‘Appendix’’.
Missing values were estimated through multiple imputation by chained equation
(generally known as MICE).
6 This technique uses information in the observed data to
predict the likely values of the unobserved data and has shown to outperform other
commonly employed techniques for dealing with missing data such as listwise deletion,
5 The non-religious group was too small to include as a separate group. Additional models for those
countries where the non-religious group was large enough to consider as a separate category showed similar
results as those with the dummy variable for religious denomination. In most nations included in our
analyses, Christians form a (large) majority among the citizens. Notable exceptions include Mali and
Senegal which are majority Islamic African states. In our dataset, more than 95 percent of the respondents of
these countries belong to the Islam. In Botswana about 43 percent of the respondents are Christian, 29
percent belong to ‘‘another’’ religion (i.e., a religion other than Islam or Christianity), and almost 28 percent
claim no religion.
6 Only 18,693 respondents of the 25,311 total cases that answered on the registration to vote question had
complete information on all independent variables (i.e., all individual items that were used to compute some
variables) included in the full models presented below. For the dependent variable collective action, the
2005 Afrobarometer contained full information on all independent variables for 18,590 respondents of the
25,074 cases. The dataset contained full information on all dependent variables for 17,741 respondents of
the 24,091 cases that answered the questions on our third type of participation, contacting.
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123pairwise deletion, mean imputation, or dummy variable adjustment (Allison 2002). We
used ICE in Stata 10 (Royston 2004), taking all independent variables as predictors and
generated ten imputations, each of which replaced cases with missing information with
plausible values based on their predictive distributions. We ran identical models for each of
the imputed data sets, using complete data on all independent variables. We then combine
these results to produce overall estimates and signiﬁcance levels. All the results presented
in the proceedings tables and graphs are the combined results across datasets (Rubin 1987).
4.3 Analytical Strategy
In the analyses below we examine gender differences in political participation across 18
sub-Saharan African nations. We present three models for gender gaps in each type of
political participation. First, bivariate models without controls, second a model with
controls for socioeconomic factors, and third a model containing both socioeconomic and
political attitudinal controls. In each we focus only on the gender gap in participation, but
full results are available upon request.
Registration to vote is predicted with binary logistic models, and ordinary least squares
models are used to analyze the respondents’ level of collective action and political contact.
Since cross-national differences in gender and political participation within the region of
sub-Saharan Africa have—to the best of our knowledge—not been studied in detail before,
we present results for each nation individually. Other approaches (e.g., multi-level models)
would necessarily obscure important differences among the nations, as is common in
global research on the topic (Inglehart and Norris 2003; Meyer et al. 1997). Moreover, the
number of countries included in our study is too limited to perform a robust multilevel
analysis (Van der Meer et al. 2010). Instead, we conclude our analysis with a descriptive
and exploratory approach to the link between macro-level variation and gender gaps found
in each of the nations.
5 Gender Gaps in Political Participation Across Sub-Saharan African Nations
5.1 Registration to Vote
We ﬁrst consider the gender gap in the probability of registering to vote in Table 1.
The bivariate models indicate a signiﬁcant gender gap in ten of the eighteen nations
included in our study, with women signiﬁcantly less likely to register to vote in Benin,
Kenya, Madagascar, Mali, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Uganda, Senegal and Tanzania.
However, in every nation but Kenya and Nigeria the gap is no longer signiﬁcant once we
control for socioeconomic characteristics. Thus, the gender gap in voter registration can be
explained by gender differences in socioeconomic status. In the ﬁnal model, we also include
controls for political attitudes, and a signiﬁcant gender gap only remains in Kenya, sug-
gesting Kenyan women are more marginalized from this form of participation regardless of
their socioeconomic status or interest in politics. Further tests (not shown)
7 comparing the
7 Logistic regressions confound the size of the effect with the error variance, limiting the applicability of
linear tests of coefﬁcients across models (Mood 2010; Long 2007). Unfortunately, the use of MICE for
missing values precludes the calculation of other effects, which are directly comparable (e.g., predicted
probabilities), thus we used linear tests for the equality of coefﬁcients across models (Paternoster, et al.
1998)( p B .05 in a two-tailed test):
Gender Gaps in Political Participation 253
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signiﬁcantly mediate the gender gap in registration to vote in Nigeria and Uganda.
5.2 Collective Action
In Table 2 we look at the gender gap in collective action, where bivariate models indicate
signiﬁcant gender gaps in all nations except Namibia, and these gender gaps remain
signiﬁcant in all nations but Mozambique when socioeconomic characteristics are added.
Conversely, in Namibia, once socio-economic variables are controlled for, women are
more likely than men to participate, and the gap grows when political attitudes are taken
Table 1 Binary logistic regression results for women’s registration to vote (t-statistics in parentheses) in 18
sub-Saharan African nations
Nation Bivariate Socioeconomic
a Political attitudes
b N
B t b t b t
Benin -.43* (-2.16) -.46 (-1.95) -.38 (-1.58) 1,198
Botswana .05 (.35) .09 (.62) .13 (.84) 1,199
Cape Verde -.07 (-.49) -.01 (-.07) \.01 (.01) 1,247
Ghana .08 (.33) .10 (.37) .15 (.57) 1,184
Kenya -.85*** (-6.46) -.86*** (-5.27) -.85*** (-5.05) 1,274
Lesotho .08 (.53) .27 (1.50) .33 (1.79) 1,157
Madagascar -.51** (-3.35) -.28 (-1.56) -.22 (-1.21) 1,340
Malawi -.07 (-.47) .10 (.59) .13 (.75) 1,199
Mali -.71*** (-4.23) -.31 (-1.54) -.31 (-1.53) 1,238
Mozambique -.51** (-2.91) -.30 (-1.59) -.27 (-1.40) 1,194
Namibia -.30* (-2.04) -.14 (-.80) -.09 (-.51) 1,198
Nigeria -.57*** (-5.99) -.31** (-2.93) 2.17 (-1.53) 2,360
Senegal -.64*** (-5.07) -.28 (-1.78) -.25 (-1.56) 1,189
South Africa .09 (.87) .10 (.90) .16 (1.34) 2,390
Tanzania -.51** (-3.43) -.20 (-1.05) -.20 (-1.02) 1,300
Uganda -.36** (-3.48) -.14 (-1.10) 2.03 (-.20) 2,398
Zambia -.21 (-1.71) -.04 (-.29) .01 (.07) 1,199
Zimbabwe -.03 (-.16) -.01 (-.05) .06 (.33) 1,047
* p\.05; ** p\.01; *** p\.001; two-tailed tests Source: Afrobarometer 2005
Bold values indicate coefﬁcients are signiﬁcantly different (p\.05; two-tailed test) from bivariate model
a Model controlling for age, age square, education, religious denomination, church attendance, employ-
ment, urban residence, poverty
b Socioeconomic model plus controls for trust in political institutions, political efﬁcacy and interest in
public affairs
Footnote 7 continued
z ¼
ðb1   b2Þ
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
SE2
1 þ SE2
2
q
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123into account. However, only in Zambia does controlling for political attitudes ameliorate a
signiﬁcant gender gap in collective action.
Overall, standard controls for socioeconomic status and political attitudes do not
mediate much of the gender gap in collective action. A comparison of the coefﬁcients
across models
8 indicates only three nations experience signiﬁcant declines in the gender
gap once both socioeconomic status and political attitudes are included: Kenya, Nigeria
and Uganda. However, in none of these nations does the gender gap disappear suggesting
that even where standard accounts explain a signiﬁcant portion of the gender gap, women
are far less likely than men to participate.
5.3 Contacting Political Ofﬁcials or Institutions
Finally, we consider gender gaps in political contact in Table 3. Bivariate models reveal
signiﬁcant gender gaps in all sub-Saharan African nations with the exception of Botswana
Namibia, showing that in all other nations, women are signiﬁcantly less likely than men to
Table 2 Regression results for women’s participation in collective action (standard errors in parentheses)
in 18 sub-Saharan African nations
Nation Bivariate Socioeconomic
a Political attitudes
b N
Benin -.61*** (.06) -.62*** (.06) -.54*** (.06) 1,187
Botswana -.22*** (.06) -.23*** (.06) -.20*** (.05) 1,188
Cape Verde -.31*** (.05) -.34*** (.06) -.29*** (.05) 1,223
Ghana -.45*** (.06) -.38*** (.06) -.34*** (.06) 1,180
Kenya -.37*** (.06) -.30*** (.06) 2.19** (.06) 1,271
Lesotho -.56*** (.06) -.58*** (.06) -.50*** (.06) 1,159
Madagascar -.42*** (.05) -.37*** (.05) -.30*** (.05) 1,333
Malawi -.16** (.05) -.14** (.05) -.11* (.05) 1,194
Mali -.60*** (.07) -.45*** (.07) -.43*** (.07) 1,243
Mozambique -.14* (.07) -.08 (.07) -.07 (.07) 1,169
Namibia .09 (.07) .15* (.06) .17** (.06) 1,179
Nigeria -.70*** (.05) -.58*** (.04) 2.51*** (.04) 2,315
Senegal -.32*** (.08) -.24** (.08) -.21* (.08) 1,167
South Africa -.21*** (.05) -.24*** (.05) -.19*** (.05) 2,356
Tanzania -.54*** (.06) -.45*** (.06) -.39*** (.06) 1,281
Uganda -.43*** (.04) -.34*** (.04) 2.28*** (.04) 2,391
Zambia -.16** (.05) -.12* (.05) -.06 (.05) 1,194
Zimbabwe -.15* (.07) -.14* (.07) -.08 (.07) 1,044
* p\.05; ** p\.01; *** p\.001; two-tailed tests Source: Afrobarometer 2005
Bold values cells indicate coefﬁcients are signiﬁcantly different (p\.05; two-tailed test) from bivariate
model
a Model controlling for age, age square, education, religious denomination, church attendance, employ-
ment, urban residence, poverty
b Socioeconomic model plus controls for trust in political institutions, political efﬁcacy and interest in
public affairs
8 Results obtained using linear tests of the equality of coefﬁcients across models (Paternoster, et al. 1998)
(p B .05 in a two-tailed test).
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123contact politicians or political institutions. Similarly to collective action, we ﬁnd that in
Mozambique gender differences are no longer signiﬁcant when controlling for socioeco-
nomic characteristics. All other gender gaps remain signiﬁcant when political attitudes are
controlled for, with the exception of Senegal.
Comparing coefﬁcients across models, we again ﬁnd that standard controls only sig-
niﬁcantly mediate the gender gap in three nations: Nigeria, Senegal and Uganda. Only in
Senegal does this drop the gender gap to insigniﬁcance. As with collective action, gender
differences in political contact seem robust to controls for socioeconomic status and
political attitudes.
6 The Context of Political Participation: Exploring Cross-National Differences
The above results indicate a weak gender gap in registering to vote, where socioeconomic
and political attitudinal characteristics tend to largely explain differences between men and
women’s probability of registering. However, women remain much less likely than men to
engage in collective actions or contact politicians or political institutions, regardless of
their socioeconomic resources or political attitudes. Nevertheless, the nations do vary in
the size and patterns of these gaps, suggesting important variation among the sub-Saharan
Table 3 Regression results for women’s engagement in political contact (standard errors in parentheses) in
17 sub-Saharan African nations
Nation Bivariate Socioeconomic
a Political attitudes
b N
Benin -.21*** (.02) -.17*** (.02) -.16*** (.02) 1,196
Botswana -.05 (.03) -.06* (.03) -.05 (.03) 1,199
Cape Verde -.14*** (.03) -.11*** (.03) -.09** (.03) 1,245
Ghana -.34*** (.03) -.30*** (.04) -.27*** (.04) 1,171
Kenya -.22*** (.03) -.18*** (.03) -.15*** (.03) 1,275
Lesotho -.23*** (.04) -.23*** (.04) -.20*** (.04) 1,119
Madagascar -.11*** (.02) -.09*** (.02) -.06** (.02) 1,345
Malawi -.20*** (.03) -.19*** (.03) -.18*** (.03) 1,198
Mali -.28*** (.03) -.24*** (.03) -.22*** (.03) 1,237
Mozambique -.12*** (.03) -.06 (.03) -.04 (.03) 1,122
Namibia -.03 (.03) -.03 (.03) -.02 (.03) 1,188
Nigeria -.21*** (.02) -.17*** (.02) 2.14*** (.02) 2,355
Senegal -.15*** (.03) -.07* (.03) 2.06 (.03) 1,192
South Africa -.05** (.02) -.05** (.02) -.04* (.02) 2,365
Tanzania -.26*** (.04) -.20*** (.04) -.18*** (.04) 1,297
Uganda -.24*** (.02) 2.17*** (.02) 2.15*** (.02) 2,399
Zambia -.12*** (.02) -.09*** (.02) -.07** (.02) 1,188
*p\.05; ** p\.01; *** p\.001; two-tailed tests Source: Afrobarometer 2005
Bold values indicate coefﬁcients are signiﬁcantly different (p\.05; two-tailed test) from bivariate model
a Model controlling for age, age square, education, religious denomination, church attendance, employ-
ment, urban residence, poverty
b Socioeconomic model plus controls for trust in political institutions, political efﬁcacy and interest in
public affairs
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123region. Therefore, we brieﬂy explore some potential linkages between the gender gaps we
found earlier and each nation’s structural socioeconomic, political and social character-
istics. Table 4 presents correlations between the regression coefﬁcients for the bivariate
gender gap we found in each nation and a variety of contextual indicators that have been
used in prior research on modernization theory and have been found to be related to gender
gaps in political participation and gender equality more general in Western industrialized
nations and across the world (e.g., Atkeson 2003; Desposato and Norrander 2009; Inglehart
et al. 2002; Inglehart and Norris 2003; Marien, Hooghe and Quintellier 2010; Wolbrecht
and Campbell 2007).
Table 4 Correlations between country-level indicators and coefﬁcients from bivariate regression models of
women’s likelihood of registering to vote, collective action, and political contact
Contextual indicators Gender gaps in
Registration
to vote
Collective
action
Political
contact
a
rr r
Political factors
Level of civil and political rights
a .08 -.15 .21
Political stability and absence of violence/terrorism
b .39 .27 .43
Government effectiveness
b .33 .17 .56*
Control of corruption
b .44 .27 .64*
Economic factors
GDP per capita, PPP (full sample)
c .56* .42 .73*
GDP per capita, PPP (dropping outliers)
c,d .52* .06 .06
Gini coefﬁcient
c,e .47* .56* .68*
Social factors
Life expectancy at birth
c -.14 -.19 -.10
Education index (adult literacy and gross enrolment)
c .57* .39 .46
Gender-related factors
% Women in legislature
f .08 .45 .25
% Women in ministerial positions
c .51* .20 .40
Year women could vote
c .34 .55* .57*
Female/male earned income ratio
c -.45 .03 -.50*
* p B 05; two-tailed test
a Average of political rights and civil liberties scores for 2005 as reported by Freedom House (www.
freedomhouse.org) recoded so that higher scores indicate more right/liberties
b Data for 2005 as collected by the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) project and publically
available through the World Bank (http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp) (Kaufmann et al.
2009)
c Data reported by the 2007 UN Human Development Report based mainly on 2005 ﬁgures (http://hdr.
undp.org/en/media/HDR_20072008_EN_Complete.pdf)
d Botswana, South Africa, and Namibia were all more than a standard deviation higher than the median and
dropped as outliers
e Cape Verde is missing for this indicator
f 2005 data obtained from the International Parliamentary Union
Gender Gaps in Political Participation 257
123As we see in Table 4, many contextual indicators are not signiﬁcantly correlated with
the gender gaps in political participation. Among the political factors,
9 an effective gov-
ernment and control of corruption are positively correlated to women’s likelihood of
political contact. In other words, in countries where citizens perceive the government as
being effective and in better control of corruption, men and women have more equal levels
political contact. Yet, such political circumstances are not signiﬁcantly related to collective
action or registration to vote, though the relationship between perceptions of corruption
and voter registration are only marginally insigniﬁcant (p = .06).
Turning to the economic factors, the correlation coefﬁcients indicate a signiﬁcant
relationship between economic inequality measured by the Gini coefﬁcient and women’s
likelihood of engaging in all types of political participation. The higher the level of income
inequality, the more likely women will register to vote, take part in collective actions or
contact politicians or institutions. Smaller gender gaps in registration to vote are also found
in the economically more prosperous sub-Saharan African countries, as indicated by the
GDP per capita. Social factors seem to matter very little, though higher levels of education
are positively related to women’s voter registration, and are marginally related to political
contact (p = .06).
10
Finally, among the gender-related indicators, the longer women have had formal voting
rights the more equal women’s and men’s participation in collective action and political
contact. Yet, perhaps surprisingly, this is not signiﬁcantly related to women’s likelihood of
registering to vote.
11 Women’s formal political power is at least partially related to gender
equality in registering to vote. Countries where the gender gap in voter registration is
smaller have more women in ministerial positions, but not in legislature. This suggests that
gender equality is not just about being elected, but women obtaining power in the gov-
ernment itself at least when it comes to institutional political participation. Women’s
formal role in ministries does not matter for the gender gap in the less institutional types of
participation. Yet, the relationship between the percent of women in legislator and col-
lective action is marginally signiﬁcant (p = .06), which is suggestive of women’s direct
involvement in collective efforts to elect more women. Finally, the female/male earned
income ratio is negatively and signiﬁcantly related to women’s likelihood to contact
politicians or political institutions, and marginally negatively related to the gender gap in
voter registration (p = .06) indicating that across sub-Saharan African nations gender gaps
in some forms of participation shrink where gender inequality in income is smaller.
9 Political factors include: The level of civil and political rights are from Freedom House scores
(www.fredomhouse.org) and indicators from the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) project
(http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp) including: Government effectiveness—perceptions of
the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from
political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the gov-
ernment’s commitment to such policies; Political Stability—perceptions of the likelihood that the govern-
ment will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including politically-
motivated violence and terrorism; and Control of Corruption—perceptions of the extent to which public
power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as ‘‘capture’’
of the state by elites and private interests (Kaufmann et al. 2009).
10 All economic, social and gender (with the exception of percentages of women in legislature which are
obtained from the International Parliamentary Union) indicators were obtained from the UN Human
Development Report from 2007, mostly based on 2005 data (http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDR_2007
2008_EN_Complete.pdf).
11 The same pattern of results—though even slightly stronger—was found when using the year women were
allowed stand for elected ofﬁce (results not shown but available upon request).
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1237 Conclusion and Discussion
Equality in political participation is considered a key component of a healthy democracy,
thus making inequality a popular topic in research on established democracies. Among the
inequalities studied, gender gaps wherein women are less politically engaged than men
have been a consistent ﬁnding (though for voting this gap has reversed in the U.S. since the
mid-eighties (Currell 2005; Uhlaner 1989; Verba et al. 1997)). Yet, research on gender
inequalities in political participation among unconsolidated democracies has lagged, and
almost no research has comparatively tested gender gaps among and between African
nations. As these nations transition into more stable democracies based on the premise of
equal participation, investigations into participatory inequalities are warranted—if not
overdue. Examining the involvement of women in politics may be particularly enlightening
given research showing the transformative effect of women’s formal political participation
on politics in general (e.g., Uganda (Tamale 1999), and numerous studies in industrialized
nations (e.g., Bystydzienski 1992; Hobson and Lindholm 1997), as well as global reports
(e.g., Waring, et al. 2000)).
Such studies can now be conducted due to relatively recently available public opinion
surveys on political behavior and attitudes conducted in developing countries. Using one
such study, the 2005 Afrobarometer, this study’s goal is to describe and explain the gender
gap in political participation across 18 sub-Saharan African countries. Results indicate that
the size and pattern of the gender gaps in political participation in sub-Saharan African
nations share some similarities with ﬁndings from Western industrialized democracies. In
line with prior research on Western industrialized nations (e.g., Coffe ´ and Bolzendahl
2010), the gender gap is smaller in the measure of the most institutionalized form of
political participation—registration to vote. In the African context, gender gaps in voting-
related behavior may be smaller since more institutionalized forms of participation may be
‘safer’ arenas for women to participate (Geisler 2004). In any case, variation in the gender
gap among different modes of participation underline the importance of considering a
variety of participation measures. Yet, unlike some ﬁndings from Western democracies,
there is no evidence that women are more likely to register to vote than men, even
controlling for socioeconomic and attitudinal characteristics. Moreover, socioeconomic
status and political attitudes rarely mediate the gender gap in collective and contact actions
(Schlozman et al. 1994; Coffe ´ and Bolzendahl 2010). Thus, explanations for sources of
gender differences based on prior work on industrialized nations appear to have weaker
explanatory power in sub-Saharan African nations.
The results suggest evidence for both modernization and cultural isomorphic processes.
First, relatively larger and more robust gender gaps would be expected based on mod-
ernization theories, and our evidence suggests this is the case. However, the pattern in the
gender gaps across types of participation also suggest evidence that isomorphism is at work
given that, as in industrialized democracies, the gender gap is smallest in the most insti-
tutional forms of participation. It may also reﬂect priorities conveyed by international
governmental and non-governmental groups (IGOs and INGOs) (e.g., the UN, the World
Bank), such as encouraging women to become more involved in elections and formal
politics.
As is common in more global studies, focusing only on general patterns in gender gaps
obscures cross-national differences within this region. Indeed, we ﬁnd important differ-
ences across the region, underscoring the importance of examining results for individual
nations. Voting—thus registering to vote—is arguably the key democratic right. Therefore,
it is positive news that in most of these nations, there is no gender difference in registering
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123to vote (Botswana, Cape Verde, Ghana, Lesotho, Malawi, South Africa, Zambia, and
Zimbabwe). Another group of nations is hampered by gender differences in socioeconomic
resources which in turn limit women’s registration (Benin, Uganda, Madagascar, Mali,
Mozambique, Namibia, Senegal, and Tanzania). If women had the same socioeconomic
proﬁle as men in these nations, they would register to vote in roughly equal amounts, while
Nigeria would also need women to have political attitudes and interest similar to men in
order to register equally to men. Kenyan women remain the least likely to register.
In terms of collective action, some nations emerge as quite different from their
neighbors. The gap is small and quickly ameliorated by socioeconomic controls in
Mozambique, and in Namibia, there is no gender gap, but if Namibian women had the
same socioeconomic and attitudinal proﬁle as Namibian men, they would be more likely to
participate. Further, both Zambian and Zimbabwean women would be as likely as men to
participate if they held similar socioeconomic resources and political attitudes. For all
other nations, signiﬁcant gender gaps remain even when gender differences in socioeco-
nomic characteristics and political attitudes have been controlled for. Women and men in
Botswana and Namibia tend to be equally engaged in political contact, while women in
Mozambique and Senegalese women would do so if their resources and attitudes matched
men. Overall, these differential patterns tell us that participation matters in various ways
for men and women both across type of participation and nation examined.
Therefore, in the ﬁnal part of our study, we explored some linkages between country-
level social, political and economic context characteristics and the size of bivariate gender
gaps in participation. As such, we provide exploratory insights into possible explanations
for cross-national differences within the sub-Saharan African region. Our ﬁndings suggest
modernization has a role in shaping equal outcomes across sub-Saharan African nations.
The length of time a nation has permitted women to vote and the presence of women in
ministerial positions, and other development indicators such as GDP per capita are posi-
tively linked to gender equality in participation. This is also reﬂected in our regression
results which showed that two of wealthiest nations, Botswana and Namibia, often have the
smallest gender gaps. However, we ﬁnd that many of the macro-level measures do not
seem to correlate very strongly with gender gaps in political participation and those that are
signiﬁcant seem to matter domain-speciﬁcally. The unevenness in these patterns suggests
that progress itself is uneven and that gender gaps in political participation may reﬂect
processes of cultural isomorphism where exposure to varying global inﬂuences differen-
tially affect development. Together these ﬁndings tend to reﬂect recent critiques of
modernization theory such that although some characteristics of development matter in
pushing women’s equality forward, it is only through careful attention to context-speciﬁc
effects that we can unravel the unevenness in this process (Adams and Orloff 2005a, b).
Further research is needed to study the impact of context on the extent of the gender
gap. Along these lines, such research may provide additional insight into reasons why
gender gaps are explained by socioeconomic resources and political attitudes in some
nations and not others. A ﬁnal challenge for future work on gender and political partici-
pation in sub-Saharan African nations would be to invest the implications of gender gaps
for political outcomes and gender equality in the region. Several studies have established a
link between women’s participation in public politics and particular policy outcomes
(Bolzendahl and Brooks 2007; Iversen and Rosenbluth 2006; Manza and Brooks 1998;
Schwindt-Bayer 2006). By investigating this link in developing nations such as the sub-
Saharan countries, social and political science scholars could test to what extent women
can put pressure on developing regimes by their political participation and as such add to
the policymaking community and research.
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